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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE RESTRICTIONS OF THE CORPORATE LIMITS OF THE CITY OF
BINGHAM CANYON, UTAH.

Civil No.
10456

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action brought by Petitioners Kennecott
Copper Corporation and The Anaconda Company, seeking
the disconnection of certain property from the city limits
of the City of Bingham Canyon, State of Utah, which action is brought pursuant to Utah Code Ann., Section 10-4-1
(Rep. Vol.1962).
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN THE LOWER COURT
The Trial Court, Judge Stewart M. Hanson presiding,
granted the prayer of Petitioners in full and ordered the
restriction of the limits of the City of Bingham Canyon,
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State of Utah, as prayed, upon a finding that justice and
equity so required.
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Appellant, City of Bingham Canyon, seeks to have
the decree restricting the limits of the city reversed and
the application of Petitioners dismissed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Beginning in 1959, at the behest of property owners
within the City of Bingham Canyon, the Petitioner, Kennecott Copper Corporation, embarked upon a program of purchasing property from property owners of that city (R.
32). Sales by the property owners were made willingly,
without coercion, and at fair prices (R. 98). At the time
of these various sales, assurances were made by Kennecott
to the sellers of the property that future purchases would
be undertaken for prices proportionate to those involved
in the executed sales (R. 41). As a result of this purchasing program, all of the property within the original Bingham Canyon City limits has been purchased by Kennecott
with the exception of 14 parcels, all of which remain within
the limits of said city after disconnection (R. 34). In total,
Kennecott has purchased 207 parcels of property at a total
cost of $3,621,860.00, including the approximate sum of
$180,000.00 for demolition of buildings on the properties
purchased (R. 60).
The property sought to be disconnected is owned exclusively by the Petitioners, Kennecott and Anaconda. The

a
original area of the City of Bingham Canyon was approximately :32-1 acres (R. 53). The petition here involved
sought to disconnect approximately 90% of this area leaving approximately 30 acres within the restricted limits of
the City of Bingham Canyon (R. 53). In the area to be
disconnected, there are no inhabited dwellings whatsoever
(R. 14). Moreover, the owner of the disconnected property,
Kennecott, has stated that it has no plans for future use of
said property for residential or commercial purposes (R.
58). The <lisconnected property will be used only by the
petitioners in pursuit of mining operations (R. 59).
Of the 30 acres remaining within the restricted city
limits, there are 14 parcels of property owned by residents
of Bingham Canyon and others (R. 34). The remainder
of this 30 acres, (over 90 % thereof) is owned by Kennecott
Copper Corporation (R. 63) (Ex. P. 2). Kennecott plans
no residential or commercial use of its properties within
the restricted city limits (R. 34).
There has been a marked decrease in the population of
the City of Bingham Canyon from a total of 3200 people· in
1930, to 2834 in 1940, 2569 in 1950, and 1516 in 1960 (R.
14). The present population of the City of Bingham Canyon is 74 people, including two or three transients (R. 50).
Of the 74 residents, only 7 are employed at the Bingham
Canyon pit, owned and operated by Kennecott Copper Corporation, out of a total employment at the mine of 2757
workers during the month of June, 1965 (R. 63-64). Kennecott Copper Corporation does not depend upon either the
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City of Bingham Canyon or its residents for a labor force
for the operation of the mine (R. 17).
A portion of the property sought to be disconnecteo

is actually a part of the open pit mine (R. 58). Naturally,
Petitioners wish to continue to use said property for mining
purposes (R. 58). In addition, other portions of the area
to be disconnected are the sites for developmental drilling
holes, which are used by the Petitioners in formulating fu.
ture mining plans (R. 61). The mining usage of such property has been hampered and impeded by virtue of zoning
ordinances, construction permits, and other Bingham City
legal requirements (R. 61-62). In one instance, an action
was instituted by the City of Bingham Canyon against
Petitioner Kennecott and its contractor seeking to enjoin
them from drilling and mining within a section of Bingham
City (R. 61).
The City of Bingham Canyon has surplus funds in its
treasury which, at the present time, amount to approxi·
mately $98,000.00 ( R. 94-95). The budget of Bingham City,
for the fiscal year 1965-1966, is approximately $29,000.00
(R. 94). By virtue of the City's surplus and the fact that it
receives sufficient funds from other tax sources, the City
of Bingham Canyon resolved that no property tax would be
levied against city property for the taxable year of 1965 (R.
84). Mayor Dimas, for the City, stated that the City could
continue to run for several years without tax revenue by
virtue of the surplus, barring some unforeseen emergency
(R. 95). The budget for the City of Bingham Canyon has
declined substantially over the last two years, (R .94), and
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decreases may be anticipated as the population cont i11ucs to dwindle.
\\'ith mrn01· exceptions, to be noted hereinafter, the
Cit.\· of Bingham Canyon does not extend municipal benefit:-; or sen:ices to the area sought to be disconnected (R.
J.i). The cvi<lence is undisputed that Kennecott Copper
Corporation maintains duplicate facilities for virtually all
services rendered by the City of Bingham Canyon (R. 55).
Thus, Kennecott Copper Corporation does not desire to use
Cit.\· services with the sole exception of the sewer system,
which consists of a cement flume into which Bingham
Creek flows and into which the residents of Bingham empty
their sewage ( R. 15, 56). The sewer, which has no disposal
plant, ( R. 56) was originally built in the early years of the
1!l:iO's as a WP A project by the City of Bingham Canyon
with financial assistance from Kennecott Copper Corporation (R. 15, 56). Kennecott has been partially responsible
for the maintenance of this sewer in the past and will continue to maintain it after disconnection (R. 64).
The Petitioner, Kennecott, and the City of Bingham
Canyon presently have a "joint" arrangement with regard
to culinary water (R. 57). By virtue of a mutual agreement between the City and Kennecott, the latter supplies a
percentage of water to the City. A spokesman for Kennecott stated that this arrangement could continue unchanged
after the disconnection (R. 57). However, if the City
should refuse or prefer not to furnish its share of these
facilities, Petitioner, Kennecott, could provide its own
culinary water with the addition of a few pipelines (R.
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57). As things presently stand, however, culinary water
is not so much a service rendered by the City of Bingham
Canyon to the area to be disconnected, but the result of a
mutual agreement between the City and the Petitioner (R.
57).
With respect to other services traditionally offered
by a city to its residents, the undisputed testimony is to
the effect that such services are not needed, required, or
usable by the Petitioner in the area to be disconnected. In
this regard, Mr. J. P. O'Keefe, General Manager of Utah
Copper Division, Kennecott Copper Corporation, stated
that, with regard to the property to be disonnected:
"We have no need for and we do not want and
there is no way we can possibly use any of the city
services" ( R. 35) .
To the extent that the few remaining buildings upon
the disconnected area require certain services, the Petitioner is able and prefers to provide said services for itself.
Chief Engineer Thuli testified as follows in this regard:
"Question: (By Mr. Evans) And will you explain whether or not the Kennecott Copper Corporation is in need or desires to have any of the
services which are ordinarily furnished by the City?
"Answer: (By Mr. Thuli) No. We have almost
100% duplication service for all of our areas and
industrial sections; and, therefore, we don't need
the services offered by the City of Bingham nor do
we desire them" ( R. 55) .
With regard to police protection, the City of Bingham
does provide a policeman who controls traffic within the
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city limits (R. 81). As concerns the protection of property and other security matters, however, the Petitioner
maintains its own security force which, with the occasional
use of the County Sheriff, is sufficient for its needs (R.
57).

With regard to fire protection, although the Bingham
City fire department has responded on occasion to fires in
the surrounding area, Mayor Dimas of Bingham conceded
that the protection had been inadequate (R. 93). Moreover, the Petitioner maintains its own fire protection force,
its own volunteer firemen, and fire protective sprinklers
in its buildings (R. 58).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
JUSTICE AND EQUITY REQUIRE THE RESTRICTION OF THE CITY LIMITS OF BINGHAM CANYON.
Respondents would agree with the initial proposition
that Utah Code Ann., Section 10-4-2 (Rep. Vol. 1962) presents only one basic criterion as a prerequisite to the restriction of municipal limits:
"That justice and equity require that such territory or any part thereof should be disconnected
from such city or town."
An examination of the Utah cases on the question of municipal disconnection suggests that there is no set definition of
"justice and equity" which can be applied with facility in
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every case. Ho\vever, there are numerous factual ingredients which reappear in virtually all of the Utah cases.
Thus, "justice and equity" have come to acquire a somewhat
specific meaning within the context of municipal severance, which meaning may be elicited from an analysis of
the facts of the several Utah cases in point.
The following subpoints constitute an analysis of the
various facets typically involved in the Utah municipal
severance decisions. Such analysis can ultimately compel
only one conclusion: That justice and equity require the
restriction of the corporate limits of Bingham Canyon City
as prayed by the Petitioner and as granted by the trial
court.

A. The alleged loss of tax revenues is neither factually nor legally sufficient to preclude restriction of corporate limits.
Shed of surplusage, the case for the Objector can be
stated as follows:
The City of Bingham Canyon objects to the
municipal severance because such severance will
result in a loss of tax revenue to the City.
Not only is the major portion of the Objector's brief devoted to a discussion of the loss of tax revenues (see Objector's brief pp. 8-10), but the only witness produced by
the Objector at trial, Mayor Peter C. Dimas, admitted that
the loss of tax revenues together with certain ephemeral,
"psychological effects" were the primary reasons for the
City's resistance to the petition to disconnect (R. 96-97).

In point of fact, however, the cries of poverty heard

from the City of Bingham Canyon are simply not supported
by tlw evidence. Mayor Dimas testified that, prior to the
clisconuection, the revenue to the City of Bingham Canyon
from sales and use tax for the year of 1964 was approximately $28,000.00 (R. 83). It is undisputed that the vast
proportion of these sales and use tax revenues, which after
disconnection will be paid to the County, derive from Kennecott's operations at the mine (R. 83). Because of this
extraordinary sales and use tax income, which amounts to
about $2,000.00 per property owner per year within the
City of Bingham, the City, unlike most other cities and
counties within the State of Utah, has had no need this
year to exact a general property tax. And, by virtue of the
excessive tax revenues enjoyed by the citizens of Bingham
Canyon, the City has been able to accrue a surplus of
$98,000.00. Given the rapidly dwindling population, the
disconnection of 90% of the City's property, and even a
minimal general property tax levy, the City of Bingham
Canyon can undoubtedly live out its remaining years in
relative prosperity on the surplus of $98,000.00, even without sales and use tax revenues.
Certainly "justice and equity" do not require the situation which has existed by virtue of which 14 property owners profit because of the fortuitous fact that they are located near an important industrial area. "Justice and
equity" do not insure such property owners the inalienable
right to be free forever from property taxes. And yet, the
City (see Objector's Brief, page 9, paragraph 4), claims
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that the potential necessity of a general property tax is
unjust and inequitable. To the contrary, it is submitted
that justice and equity would demand that all property
owners, including Kennecott, pay a fair share of City expenses through a general property tax.
Furthermore, the Objector certainly stretches the fact
when it states (see p. 10 of Objector's Brief) that Kennecott does not want to pay its fair share of expenses. In
point of fact, Kennecott as an owner of more than 90%
of the remaining property will remain the largest property
owner within the restricted city limits, and thus, will pay
its fair share for municipal services through the general
property tax. Moreover, in addition to taxes, Kennecott
will continue to make contributions to the City of Bingham
Canyon by way of assistance in the maintenance of the
water system and sewage system. It can hardly be claimed,
therefore, that Kennecott is abandoning the poor child of
Bingham City without revenues and without support. To
the contrary, Kennecott does now and will continue to pay
a pre-eminently fair share of expenses incurred in the op·
eration of the city and the provision of its services.
Moreover, even if it were true that the City would
suffer the alleged loss of tax revenues because of the muni·
cipal disconnection, this would not be a sufficient reason
to deny the disconnection as prayed. It is only obvious that
any reduction in municipal acreage will ultimately result
in a loss to the city of property tax revenues. If such a loss
of tax revenues were a sufficient reason to preclude sever·
ance, there would never be a severance granted. Apparent·
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ly sen;;;ing this situation, the Supreme Court of Utah has

repeatedly held that the deprivation of tax revenues is an
insufficient reason to preclude municipal severance. Thus,
in Applicat,ion of Peterson, 92 Utah 212, 216, 66 P. 2d 1195
(1937), this court stated:
"So, also, the mere fact that the town would
lose the income derived from the segregated lands
is not a suffiicent reason to defeat the action."
Similarly, in the case of In Re Peterson, 87 Utah 144, 154,
48 P. 2d 468 ( 1935), the town alleged that the present
taxes were "barely sufficient" to support the town government, but the Court said :
"The mere fact that the town of Moab would
lose its income heretofore derived from the taxation
of the lands in question does not justify the refusal
of petitioner's application to have his land segregated from the town."

A fortiori, where the City of Bingham Canyon has a fat
surplus which, together with normal property taxes, can
support the City easily for its forseeable future, the cry
of poverty is not a sufficient reason to deny disconnection;
particularly where, as here, the Petitioner will continue to
be the largest taxpayer in the city even after severance.
There are no direct, substantial, or appreciable
municipal benefits conferred upon the area to be d'isconnected.
B.

Another factor relied upon by the Objector in its Brief
is that the City of Bingham Canyon renders municipal services and benefits to the area to be disconnected, and thus,
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justice and equity purportedly require that the petition be
denied. Again, however, an analysis of the Utah cases, tc.
gether with the facts of this case, clearly shows this not tu
be the case.
By its mere existence, a city tends to create certain
benefits for property owners in the vicinity as well as the
public in general, but such benefits are not sufficient, within the contemplation of Utah law, to require the retention
of such properties within the city's limits. Rather, the
Supreme Court of Utah has made it entirely clear that the
benefits must be tangible and specific. This, for example,
the court has required "direct and appreciable benefits."
(In Re Fullmer, 33 Utah 43, 46, 92 Pac. 768 (1907)) and
"substantial, direct and special benefits," (Howard v.
North Salt Lake, 7 Utah 2d 278, 284, 323 P. 2d 261
(1958)). See also, In Re Smithfield City, 70 Utah 564, 568,
262 Pac. 104 (1927) ("direct or appreciable benefit"); In
Re Chief Consolidated Min. Co., 71 Utah 430, 443, 266 Pac.
1044 (1928) ("direct and special benefit") (dissenting
opinion).
What then are the direct, special, substantial and appreciable benefits conferred by the City upon the area to
be disconnected? Basically, the following "benefits" are
alleged by the Objector as being sufficient to preclude severance: Water, sewer, roads, police protection, fire protection, and garbage collection. But a closer analysis of the
facts suggests that these are either: (1) not provided by
the City at all, or (2) if available, are unnecessary and
duplicative by virtue of the Petitioner's own facilities.
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These benefits are not in fact
prnvided by the City to the Petitioner. The undisputed
c,·ide11ce is to the effect that the sewer system is little more
Uwn a concrete flume into which a natural creek flows. The
Petitioner, Kennecott Copper Corporation, originally assish·d in the construction of this facility, it has been jointly
responsible for the maintenance thereof to the present date,
~we! it will continue this service in the future (R. 64).
Clc::trly, this is no more a service furnished by the City to
the Petitioner than it is a service furnished by the Peti! i<>ner to the City. In no event can this be properly described as an appreciable, special or direct benefit accorded
b,1· the City to the property to be disconnected.
ll'atcr and se1 1 .·cr -

Much the same thing is true with regard to the water
system. The City and the Petitioner have a joint agreement with respect to culinary water by virtue of which
Petitioner provides water to the City. Again, there has
been a joint responsibility for the maintenance of the system (R. 57), and it clearly cannot be said, as a net proposition, that the City furnishes an appreciable or special
benefit to the property in this regard. Moreover, the evidence shows that, if need be, the Petitioner could supply
its own water with facility (R. 57).
The Objector has continually stressed the
significance of the fact that tourists and workers traveling
tn the mine must use the Bingham City road. Thus, the
ar~~·11ment goes, since the City maintains the road, it is uniust and inequitable for the Petitioner to disconnect part
of its property from the City limits. That this is a nonRoads -
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sequitur is aptly demonstrated by the fact that tourists and
workers traveling to the mine must also drive through
Copperton, Magna, Lark, and Salt Lake City to reach their
destination. Demonstrably, all of these cities should, under
Objector's theory, have an equal opportunity to include the
mine within their boundaries.
Moreover, it has not been suggested that City road
maintenance will continue in the area to be disconnected
'
and thus this is not a service which is relevant in determin.
ing the propriety of severance.
Less than two miles of road will remain within the
City after disconnection. The obligation to maintain this
road is one owed to the public in general and is not a suffi.
cient ground to deny disconnection. This court has expressly so held in another case, In Re Chief Consolidated
Mining Co., 71 Utah 430, 266 Pac. 1044 (1928) wherein
the Court stated :
"The main road running through the inhabited
area was constructed, and is kept in repair, by the
City, and there is also some testimony that the road
leading from the inhabited portion of Mammoth
City to one of the areas designated 3 was, to a lim·
ited extent, kept in repair by the municipality."
After noting such "benefits" existed along with others,
the Court concluded:
"The undisputed testimony respecting the
municipal benefits by way of municipal improve·
ments such as above enumerated and as found by
the Court on any of the areas are not alone sufficient, in our judgment to deny the Petitioners their
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claim for severance of the area from the boundaries of the municipality."
Police and Fire Protection - As an initial proposition,
these municipal services are rendered only on a de minimus
basis. The "police protection" consists of a patrolman who
performs essentially a traffic control function within the
inhabited portion of the City. The fire protection consists
of a volunteer department, which renders much of its performance outside of the city boundaries (R. 91) and which,
measuring effectiveness by fire losses incurred, has not
been markedly successful (R. 93). The case of In Re Chief
Consolidated Mining Co., supra., is again pertinent inasmuch as the Court, after noting the existence of a similar
fire protection service, concluded that it and other analogously indirect benefits "are not alone sufficient, in our
judgment, to deny the petitioner's their claim for severance
of the area from the boundaries of the municipality."
Moreover, the Petitioner does not need or desire police
and fire protection on the area to be disconnected inasmuch
as it has its own facilities for these needs. Again, the
Utah authority on the matter indicates that the owners of
uninhabited property, seeking severance from a municipality, have the right to refuse available city services if they
prefer to provide for themselves. In two Utah cases, Petitioners could have made use of city water, but found it
more convenient to obtain it elsewhere. In both instances,
this Com't granted severance presumably on the theory
that available services, which are not required or desired,
are not sufficient to render severance unjust or inequitable.
Howard v. Town of North Salt Lake, 7 Utah 2d 278, 323 P.
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2d 261, (1958); Application of Peterson, 92 Utah 212, 6fi
P. 2d 1195 (1937). The same duplication exists with 10 _
gard to garbage collection (R. 16).
In summary, therefore, it would appear that the services provided by the City to the disconnected area are far
short of meeting the descriptions of substantial, special,
direct or appreciable. For the most part, they are services
which merely redound to the benefit of the public in general
and which have no direct or special application to the subject property. Clearly Petitioner's property is not benefited
appreciably by being included within the City limits of
Bingham Canyon. Therefore, it is submitted that justice
and equity, as defined in the Utah cases, would demand
severance. See, e.g., Howard v. North Salt Lake, 7 Utah
2d 278, 323 P. 2d 261, (1958).
C. There is not such a connective and interdependent
rel,ationship between Bingham City and the area to be disconnected as would, in justice and equity, dictate their perpetual unity.

Objector has cited and relied upon the Utah case of In
Re Chief Consolidated Mining Company, 71 Utah 430, 266
Pac. 1044 ( 1928). While there are some superficial similarities between that case and the instant one, it is clearly
distinguishable on the facts, so far as it holds that disconnection should not be granted. That case involved a petition
by the mining company to disconnect its properties from
the small mining town of Mammoth City. With regard to
municipal benefits and improvements, the evidence was
similar to that involved in the instant case in that there
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e ·,J 110 :;;ubstantial benefits, and the court ultimately con('luded the benefits were insufficient to deny the Petition,,i'·:, daim for severance (71 Utah at 434). However, the
nwjority in that decision found a different type of benefit
extended b.v the City to the mining company - it provided
the only convenient residence for mine workers. Thus, the
,

1 1

court noted:
"It quite definitely appears that a large percent
of the men residing in Mammoth City are employees
of the mines located within the boundaries of such
city. The fact that the workmen needed to carry on
tile mining operations have a place to reside near
the mines could not be otherwise than a direct bene-,
fit to the 1nine owners."
·

In the court's view, the relationship between the mine

owners and the city was of a symbiotic nature - i.e. but
for the city, the mines could not operate by virtue of a lack
of workers, and, conversely, but for the mine the city would
have no reason to exist. Thus, the court concluded:
"Mammoth City, as the testimony shows, has
a population of approximately 1,000 people. The
interests of the mining companies or rather the
mines operated \vithin the municipality, are so
closely related and dependent upon the labor thus
gathered together that they ought not and cannot
in equity and justice, disclaim any interest in supporting these necessary conveniences."
Thus, having found that the mine owners had an obligation to help support the city, the court reversed the trial
court and denied severance of 3 parcels, and granted severance of 1. Justices Cherry and Hansen dissented arguing
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that all of the parcels should have been severed as prayed.
It is submitted that the Mammoth City decision is clearly
distinguishable from and clearly not controlling in the instant case on the following grounds :
( 1) There is no evidence whatsoever in the instant case that there is an interdependent relationship
between the petitioners and the City of Bingham Canyon. Nor is there any evidence that the City of Bingham Canyon offers any benefit to the mine by virtue
of being a residential area for its laborers. To the
contrary, of some 2500 mine workers, only seven are
presently residing in the city of Bingham. Certainly,
it cannot therefore be claimed that the mine depends
upon Bingham as a labor source.
(2) There is no evidence in the instant case that
after disconnection, the petitioners will discontinue
their contributions to and support of the City of Bingham Canyon. The evidence shows that Kennecott Copper Corporation, after disconnection, will own approximately 90% of the real property within the restricted
limits of Bingham City. As a major property owner,
Kennecott will be called upon to contribute substan·
tially to support the services offered by Bingham.
Moreover, by virtue of joint agreements between Kennecott and Bingham, the former will continue to sup·
ply maintenance and assistance with regard to the
sewer system and the water system which serve the
City of Bingham Canyon. Therefore, the petitioners
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here do not, in the words of the Court, "disclaim any
interest in supporting these necessary conveniences."
(3) It is clear that the holding in the Mammoth
City case rests upon the theory that severance should
be denied, given a dependent relationship, where severance would result in a loss of tax revenue to the city.
If this be the case, it is submitted that the case has
been overruled by two subsequent cases which have
dearly held that the loss of tax revenues is insufficient, in justice and equity, as a basis for denying
severance. Application of Peterson, 92 Utah 212, 66
P. 2d 1195 (1937); In re Peterson, 87 Utah 144, 48 P.
2d 468 (1935).
( 4) Finally, it is submitted that the recent case
of Howard v. North Salt Lake, 7 Utah 2d 278, 323 P.
2d 261 ( 1958) is more closely in point. In that case,
the court noted that only two employees of 229 employed in an industry in the disconnected area lived
in the town itself. Impliedly, the Court concluded that
this was hardly sufficient to create a Mammoth Citylike symbiotic relationship. A fortiori, when only
seven employees of some 2500 are residents of Bingham, the symbiotic relationship does not exist and
severance should therefore be granted.
Since, sans the interdependency found in the Mammoth
City case, said case is factually quite similar to the instant
case, it is submitted that that case can be cited in favor of
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severance in the instant case, since there, as here, the benefits were insufficient, alone, to preclude severance.

D. The totality of facts here involved, in justice and
equity, dictate severance of the subject property.
In order to attain a workable application of the concepts of "justice and equity" in municipal severance cases
'
it is imperative that the nature and function of a municipal
corporation should be analyzed. It seems beyond dispute
that the major function of cities is to provide a local government to administer and provide services to a population
center. It seems also clear that some density of residential
population is necessary to make the existence of a municipal corporation efficient or necessary. Thus, for example,
in order to incorporate a city or town, there must be a
petition by at least 100 real property taxpayers within the
proposed city limits. Utah Code Ann. Section 10-2-1 (Rep.
Vol. 1962). It is interesting to note, in passing, that there
are only 15 property owners within the original boundaries
of Bingham City, and thus, were this an incorporation pro·
ceeding, rather than one for disconnection, a municipal
government could not even be created. The unsuitability of
including uninhabited, nonresidential properties within city
limits has also been recognized by this Court in its deci·
sions, which, without notable exception, have allowed sev·
erance where the property involved was uninhabited and
received no appreciable municipal benefits. See e.g. How·
ard v. North Salt Lake, 7 Utah 2d 278, 328 P. 2d 261
(1958); In Re Peterson, 87 Utah 144, 48 P. 2d 468 (1935);
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Christensen v. Town of Clearfield, 66 Utah 455, 243 Pac.
367 (1926). And, as stated by the Supreme Court of Iowa,
in McKeon v. Council Bluffs, 221 N. W. 351, (Iowa 1928):

"The purpose of municipal incorporation is to
furnish local self government and cooperative service. The needs of the municipality and the benefits
to the property and residents thereon are the sole
justification for inclusion of land within municipal
limits."
Since the land herein involved is wholly uninhabited,
is not needed for the future growth or development of Bingham City, does not receive appreciable municipal benefits,
and is not needed by the municipality, justice and equity
would seem to require its severance. The words of Justice
Hansen, dissenting in part in the case of In re Chief Consolidated Mining Co., are appropriate:
"When property owners seek to have their
property disconnected from a city, under our laws,
or laws similar thereto, inquiry in the adjudicated
cases is directed toward the results based upon a
determination of these propositions: Does the property sought to be excluded from the city receive any
direct and special benefit resulting from the exercise of the powers granted to the city? Is it probable that the future growth and expansion of the
city will require the territory sought to be disconnected? Is the property sought to be disconnected
necessary for the use of the city? If the answers
to these three propositions are all in the negative,
it is quite generally, if not uniformly, held, and
properly so, that equity and justice require that the
request of the property owners be granted and the
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property disconnected from the city."
430, 440, 266 Pac. 1044 (1928) ) .

(71 Utah

Nor can the Court, in its consideration of justice and
equity, ignore the obvious public interests involved in this
case. The present boundaries of Bingham City, which
stretch far outside the inhabited section thereof (see Ex.
P-2), have resulted in the creation of substantial obstacles
to the industrial development of the area involved. Mining
operations may not be carried on with facility by virtue of
zoning ordinances, construction permits, and other diffi.
culties which arise from the inclusion of this area within
the city limits. It seems questionable, that justice an<l
equity would require the frustration of an important commercial and industrial development within the State of
Utah for the sake of 14 property owners.
Nor should this court ignore the public interest in the
use and sales taxes presently created by the Kennecott mining complex. As things presently stand, the City of Bingham Canyon receives a large amount of these taxes - some
$28,000.00 this year. It would seem more logical and more
conducive to public well-being that this revenue be distributed throughout the county, which county contributes
numerous conveniences and necessities to the mining complex.
Finally, it should be noted that this is not a case
where the Petitioners are seeking to avoid their responsibilities to financially support Bingham City. As noted by
the Objector, in its brief, the taxes of Kennecott Copper
Corporation would not decrease by virtue of this disconnec-
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tion, there being at present no property tax within the
dt:c As a matter of fact, since after disconnection a general property tax will probably be levied within the remaining- city limits, Kennecott may incur an increase in tax
obligations by virtue of the disconnection.
CONCLUSION
In summary, therefore, it is submitted that justice and
Pquity require the severance of the subject property from
the city limits of the City of Bingham Canyon, Utah, for
the following reasons:

The subject property is not suitable for habitation 01· residential use, and thus is not the type of property
\d1ich normally belongs in a city, it being remote from the
City and not required for its future growth and development.
( 1)

(2) The Petitioners will continue to financially supp(lrt the City 0f Bingham Canyon through property taxes
anct through contributions to the maintenance of the sewer
~rncl water systems.
( 3) The disconnection will allow the progression of
industrial and mining usage of the property to the ultimate
betterment of the public in general.
1) The city renders no substantial, appreciable, direct or special benefits to the area sought to be disconnected.
(

1
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( 5) The public in general, rather than 74 members
thereof, should enjoy the tax revenues from the mining
operation herein involved.
Respectfully submitted,
PARSONS, BERLE, EVANS
& LATIMER,
By Elliott W. Evans and
Gordon L. Roberts,
Attorneys for
Petitioner-Respondent,
Kennecott Copper Corporation.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & McCARTHY,
Attorneys for
Petitioner-Respondent,
The Anaconda Company.

